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Abstract 
This research attempts to study the capital structure issue in India in the context of the country’s ongoing 
economic reforms. The corporate sector in the country is characterized by a large number of firms operating in a 
largely deregulated and increasingly competitive environment. Since 1990, financial liberalization has changed 
the operating environment of firms, by giving more flexibility to the Indian financial manager in choosing the 
capital structure of the firm. However, existing studies on the capital structure issue in India have been 
conducted in the backdrop of strongly interventionist and regulated regime of the pre-reform period.. The study 
also has some advantages over earlier studies in the context of the data used. First, most of the existing empirical 
studies on capital structure in India have been restricted in scope due to the poor cross-sectional variation in data. 
In contrast, the sample used in this study encompasses a wide range of firms and industries. The financial and 
qualitative data used in the study is obtained from the database PROWESS of the Center for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy for a ten year period, 2000-2001 to 2010-2011. 
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1. Introduction 
Several competing theories have emerged, since Modigliani and Miller’s famous propositions on the capital 
structure, to test the ground realities of capital market imperfections such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, and information asymmetries. Therefore, the determinants of the capital structure of companies have been 
debated for long in corporate finance. In the light of this debate, this research attempts to test the important 
determinants of the capital structure of companies. The Miller-Modigliani (MM) arbitrage theorems on capital 
structure are legendary. They suggest that in perfect markets a firm's financial policies do not affect value. In 
practice, capital structure matters, because empirical evidence shows consistent pattern of leverage ratios, both 
across industries and for individual firms over time. Leverage ratios of specific industries have been documented 
by many researchers. Departures from this rarefied world of frictionless markets lead us to serious consideration 
of market imperfections and their effect on the share price of the firm. A substantial amount of literature suggests 
that firms try to maintain a target debt ratio, to some extent influenced by industry-specific imperfections. What 
makes the capital structure debate especially intriguing is that the theories lead to such different, and in some 
ways diametrically opposed, decisions and outcomes. For example, some finance scholars have followed Miller 
and Modigliani in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that 
they have no predictable material effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that 
corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields of greater debt 
against potentially large costs of financial distress, including those arising from corporate under investment. But 
if too much debt can destroy value by causing financial distress and underinvestment, others have argued that too 
little debt especially in large, mature companies can lead to overinvestment and low returns on capital. Still 
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others argue that corporate managers making financing decisions are concerned primarily about the “signaling” 
effects of such decisions—the tendency of stock prices to fall significantly in response to announcements of 
common stock offerings (which can make such offerings quite expensive for existing shareholders) and to rise in 
response to leverage- increasing recapitalizations. Building on this signaling argument, MIT professor Stewart 
Myers has suggested that corporate capital structures are the largely unplanned outcomes of individual financing 
decisions in which managers follow a financial pecking order a financing rule in which retained earnings are 
systematically preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.  
According to Myers, corporate managers making financing decisions are not really thinking about a long-run 
target debt to-equity ratio. Instead, they take the path of least resistance and choose what at the time appears to 
be the lowest-cost financing vehicle generally debt with little thought about the future consequences of these 
choices Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) provide the theoretical framework that links capital 
structure and market structure. Contrary to the profit maximization objective postulated in industrial organization 
literature, these theories, like the corporate finance theory, assume that the firm’s objective is to maximize the 
wealth of shareholders, and show that market structure affects capital structure by influencing the competitive 
behavior and strategies of firms. Firms in the oligopolistic market will follow the strategy of maximizing their 
output for improving profitability in favorable economic conditions, Brander and Lewis (1986). In unfavorable 
economic conditions, they would take a cut in production and reduce their profitability. Shareholders enjoy 
increased wealth in good periods, but they tend to ignore decline in profitability in bad times as unfavorable 
consequences are passed on to lenders because of shareholders’ limited liability status. Thus, the oligopoly firms, 
in contrast to firms in the competitive markets, would employ higher levels of debt to produce more when 
opportunities to earn higher profits arise. The implied prediction of the output maximization hypothesis is that 
capital structure and market structure have positive relationship. In corporate finance, the agency costs theory 
supports the use of high debt, and it is consistent with the prediction of the output maximization hypothesis.  
2. Literature Review 
Most empirical studies of capital structure focus on mature market economies, but less has been done in 
emerging economies. Moreover, existing studies generally repeat empirical tests devised for mature market 
economies, trying to confirm the universality of mainstream capital structure theories. Not surprisingly, they 
mainly end up with statistically insignificant coefficients, sometimes even theoretically unacceptable 
correlations, and relatively low explanatory power for the models. Empirical tests of trade-off and pecking-order 
theory were conducted by Berk (2006), among others, who studied the leverage drivers of Slovenian blue-chip 
firms. He tests the dependence of leverage on the tangibility of assets, growth rate, future growth opportunities, 
firm size, earnings volatility, profitability, and value of non-debt tax shields in the periods 2000–01 and 
2002–03. He finds that, in the first period, only profitability, and in the second period, only tangibility of assets 
significantly affects firm leverage. The correlation between both explanatory variables and leverage is negative, 
and Berk (2006) thus concludes that the pecking order hypothesis explains capital structure choice in Slovenian 
firms better than does trade-off theory. Although private firms use significantly more debt to finance their 
activities, he finds that their financial policies do not differ significantly from the financial policies of public 
listed firms Berk (2006). Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997), who examined the capital structure of Polish firms, 
find higher leverage in large, new, foreign-owned firms; firms with a stronger cash position and firms with low 
ownership concentration. Cornelli, Portes and M. Schaffer (1996), investigating whether the financial sector in 
Hungary and Poland provided enough funds to firms and whether it is monitoring them adequately, find a 
negative correlation for profitability and tangibility of assets with leverage and a positive correlation between 
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size and leverage. The results of their study are generally supported by Nivorozhkin (2002), who investigates the 
determinants of capital structures of listed Hungarian firms. However, Baer and Gray (1995), who conduct a 
similar regression analysis on a sample of Polish firms, find positive but mainly insignificant coefficients on 
these variables. Klapper, Sarria-Allende and.Sulla(2002) studying financing patterns in small and medium-sized 
firms in Eastern Europe, again evaluate the key relation between various debt ratios and determinants of leverage 
as predicted by modern capital structure theory. They find that leverage is positively correlated with size and 
growth and negatively correlated with age. The correlation between profitability and long-term debt is found to 
be negative, whereas the correlation between profitability and short-term debt, as well as total debt, is positive. 
They observe a negative correlation between tangibility of assets and short-term and total debt, a positive 
correlation between tangibility and long-term debt, and a negative correlation between non-debt tax shields and 
all types of debt ratios. 
3. Objective of Study & Methodology 
 3.1 Objective of Study 
The objective of this study is to shed light on the factors determining capital structure of Indian firms. The 
changes in the financial markets during the past decade of liberalization have certainly made an impact on the 
financial structure of corporate units. 
3.2 Data collection  
The period of study is from 2000-01 to 2010-11. The study covers all the listed companies in the manufacturing 
companies in India. Companies for which the data is not available are omitted. The total number of companies 
studied in this industry is 284. The financial and qualitative data used in the study is obtained from the database 
PROWESS of the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy for a period, 2000-2001 to 2010-2011. Only 
non-financial, non-banking and non-governmental firms that are included in the BSE 100, BSE 200, BSE 500, 
BSE Midcap Index, BSE Smallcap Index, SENSEX, S&P CNX 500, CNX Midcap, CNX Midcap 200, Nifty 
Junior and Nifty, and for whom all relevant data are available for  proposed period of study are included in the 
sample. 
3.3 Research Methodology 
The study employs a panel regression model. Panel data refers to data containing time series observations of a 
number of economic units; observations in panel data involve at least two dimensions – a cross sectional 
dimension reflecting differences between individual units, for example firms (usually denoted by a subscript i) 
and a time series dimension reflecting changes within the firm over time (usually denoted by the subscript t). 
This capacity to blend inter firm differences and intra firm dynamics, an attribute that either cross sectional or 
time series data alone could not achieve, has made panel data models indispensable in social science research. 
Such pooling as discussed above results in advantages in two counts; first, panel data gives more informative 
data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; second, it 
minimizes the bias that might result if individual observations are 
aggregated into broad aggregates.  
4. Interpretation and Findings 
In the panel data model developed here the dependent variable long-term borrowing is defined as a ratio of Long 
term borrowing to  total assets, the term (long term) having its usual definition with respect to time. The 
independent variables include size of the firm (Size), profitability(Prof), Collateral value of assets (COVA), 
growth (G), uniqueness (Uniq), Non depreciation tax Shield (NDTS), liquidity (L), stock liquidity (SL) and 
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degree of international activity (DIA). The study employs a panel regression model and takes the following 
form. 
(LTB/TA)i,t = 0+ 1 Sizei,t + 2 Profi,t + 3 COVAi,t + 4 Gi,t +5 Uniqi,t + 6NDTSi,t + 
7Li,t + 8SLi,t + 9DIAi,t +eit 
Where Size is measured as the natural logarithm of sales, profitability is measured as a ratio of operating income 
to total assets, Collateral value of assets is measured as a ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, growth measured 
by the growth in total assets, uniqueness is measured as a ratio of selling expenses to sales, Non-depreciation tax 
shield is measured as a ratio of depreciation charges to total operating income, liquidity measured by ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities, Stock liquidity here is measured by the ratio of number of days a stock is 
traded to the total number of trading days per year. degree of international activity, measured as a ratio of total 
foreign exchange earnings as a proportion of sales revenue 
 
Hypothesis: 
 
H1: Long Term Borrowing is positively related to size (H01) 
H2: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to profitability (H02) 
H3: Long Term Borrowing is positively related to collateral value of assets(H03) 
H4: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to growth (H04) 
H5: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to firm’s uniqueness(H05) 
H6: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to available depreciation tax shield (H06) 
H7: Long Term Borrowing is positively related to company liquidity (H07) 
H8: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to stock liquidity. (H08) 
H9: Long Term Borrowing is negatively related to the degree of international activity. (H09) 
4.1 Interpretation and Findings 
Before testing the above mentioned hypothesis using the above panel data, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and Hausman specification tests are carried out for the sample of firms 
(manufacturing industry) to know the significance of firm and time effects in the data set, and to find out a 
suitable panel data method for the estimation of the model. Table4.1 shows that the null hypothesis 

:     σ
=0 
and 
; σ
 =	σ	
  =0 are rejected. Clearly, the LR test result shows that both the firm and time effects are 
present in the data. Lagrange Multiplier test statistics presented in the table indicate that either the fixed effect or 
random effect panel data models are to be preferred to the classical regression model, implying that the use of 
panel data model is justified. The Hausman specification test results presented in the table infer to focus on the 
fixed effect estimates, so that both the fixed effects firm and fixed effects firm and time models are preferred to 
other models to determine the factors that affect borrowing for manufacturing firms. 
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Table 4.1 
Likelihood ratio(LR) test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM)and Hausman test results for the period of 2000-01 to 
2010-11 
Tests Test statistic P value Test statistic P-value 
LR Test χ
2
(264)=2566.77 0.000 χ
2
(274)=2590.53 0.000 
LM Test χ
2
(1)=1541.68 0.000 χ
2
(2)= 1546.37 0.000 
Hausman Test χ
2
(9)= 114.29 0.000 χ
2
(9)= 101.94 0.000 
Table 4.2 
Variables Fixed Effect firm model results Fixed effect firm and time model 
results 
Constant ------------ 0.0611(0.0450) 
Size 0.0149(0.0061)** 0.0112(0.0071)** 
Profitability -0.1307(0.0134) -0.1327(0.0163) 
COVA 0.2178(0.0320) 0.2123(0.0319)* 
Growth  -0.0096(0.0045)** -0.0093(0.0045)** 
Uniqueness -0.2789(0.1185)** -0.2813(0.1181)** 
NDTS  0.0007(0.0009) 0.0009(0.0009) 
Liquidity 0.0064(0.0014)* 0.0064(0.0014)* 
Stock Liquidity -0.0455(0.0188)** -0.0240(0.0213)** 
Degree of International activity 0.0897(0.0330)* 0.0920(0.0329)* 
N 1835 1835 
Adjusted R
2
 .786 .788 
F-test Result 18.97* 18.97* 
Note-   1) The fixed effect does not have a n intercept term 
            2) The figures in parenthesis alongside the coefficients shows the standard errors 
           3) *,**, represent the 1% and 5% level of significance respectively 
With regard to long term borrowing in the context of manufacturing firms the regression coefficients associated 
with size, profitability, COVA, growth, uniqueness and stock liquidity have the expected sign. There is however 
no evidence to substantiate the negative relationship between availability of depreciation tax shield and long 
term borrowing. Findings also suggest a positive and significant association between long term borrowing and 
firm liquidity, which might be indicative of the fact that more liquid firms have better debt service capacity and 
consequently borrow more in the long term. Findings on the association between degree of international activity 
and long term borrowing however provide evidence contrary to findings elsewhere. Here it is observed that long 
term borrowing is positively associated with degree of international activity implying that in the context of 
Indian manufacturing firms diversified revenue base might in fact result in enhanced debt capacity. 
 
5.Conclusion 
Panel data method: Is the most reliable method in comparison to traditional models as it considers stationality in 
the data and uses fixed effect and time effect models avoiding autocorrelation, multicollinearity& 
heteroskedasticity. This model determines that size, COVA, Liquidity of firm & degree of international activity 
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has a significant positive relationship with firm leverage, while growth, uniqueness and stock liquidity has a 
negative significant relationship with firm leverage. Matching with results obtained by previous studies, the 
model finds no control of profitability and non depreciation tax shield in determination of debt equity ratio of a 
firm. 
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